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he ultimate goal of Canadian monetary policy is maintaining a low,
stable rate of inflation in order to foster efficient economic perform-
ance and a rising standard of living for Canadians. More specifical-
ly, the Bank of Canada1 aims to keep inflation inside a target range of 1 to
3 percent. This range, established jointly with the federal government,
was first announced in 1991 and has been extended through the end of
2006. Over the medium term, the target applies to total CPI. The Bank also
uses a core CPI measure as a guide to future inflation developments over
the shorter term. The Bank of Canada’s operational target is the overnight
rate, which is set at the midpoint of a 50 basis point operating band.2
Central Bank Assets
At the end of 2000 the Bank of Canada had Can$40 billion in assets,
the bulk (83 percent) of which were investments in securities issued or
guaranteed by the Government of Canada, which are generally held to
maturity. Other investments (4 percent) were largely composed of foreign
currency investments acquired in short-term swap arrangements with the
government’s Exchange Fund Account. In addition, the Bank’s assets
included deposits in foreign currencies (2 percent), advances to members
of the Canadian Payment Association (2 percent), and “other assets” (9
percent), the bulk of which were Government of Canada securities pur-
chased under resale agreements.20 Second Quarter 2002 New England Economic Review
Standing Facilities
The advent of the Large Value Transfer System
(LVTS), the Canadian Payments Association’s new
electronic payments system, which became fully oper-
ational in February 1999, resulted in some changes in
the Bank’s operating procedures.3 The Bank sets a tar-
get for the overnight interest rate at the midpoint of its
50 basis point operating band. LVTS participants need-
ing an overdraft (fully collateralized, as discussed
below) at the day’s final settlement are charged the
Bank rate, the upper limit of the operating band. The
Bank pays an interest rate equal to the lower limit of
the band on positive balances remaining after the
LVTS settlement. The Bank typically sets the level of
settlement balances in the financial system at a slight
positive value.4 Thus, LVTS participants with deficits
know that potential counterparties with surplus funds
exist. After the close of client business at 6 p.m., partic-
ipants have one-half hour to trade with each other to
reduce their LVTS positions through transactions
made at market rates.5
Open Market Operations
The Bank announces any change in the target rate
and operating band at 9 a.m. If necessary, the Bank will
intervene in the open market at about 11:45 a.m. if the
overnight rate is straying from its target in the mid-
point of the band. It uses Special Purchase and Resale
Agreements (SPRAs) with a term of one business day
if the overnight rate is too high and Sale and Repur-
chase Agreements (SRAs) if the rate is too low.6 These
repo and reverse repo-type transactions are based on
Government of Canada securities, which are marked
to market and subject to haircuts that rise with the
maturity of the security to as much as 2.5 percent. The
counterparties in these operations are the primary
dealers, each of which has a predetermined limit for
both types of transactions. The primary dealers are a
group of government securities distributors who
maintain a minimum share of the activity in the mar-
ket for Canadian government debt. (Prior to the start
of the LVTS, SPRAs and SRAs were used to reinforce
the upper and lower limits of the band.)
Auctions of Government Deposits
To keep the settlement balances in the financial
system slightly positive, the Bank neutralizes the
impact of any public sector flows between the Bank of
Canada and the financial system. It does so by trans-
ferring government deposits to and from the govern-
ment’s account at the Bank of Canada. The transfer
occurs through two daily auctions—at 9:15 a.m. and at
4:15 p.m. The daily amount auctioned is larger/small-
er than the amount maturing by enough to offset the
impact of the public sector flows and achieve the
desired level of settlement balances. (Prior to the start
of the LVTS, the transfer of government balances
between the Bank of Canada and the direct clearers
was one of the Bank’s primary tools for implementing
policy. This transfer was used to adjust the level of set-
tlement balances as well as to neutralize the impact of
public sector flows. The transfer involved directly
drawing down or redepositing government balances
with financial institutions.)
Criteria for Participation in the 
Large Value Transfer System 
The participants in the LVTS must be members of
the Canadian Payments Association (CPA)—that is,
regulated, supervised, deposit-taking financial institu-
tions—and they must be linked by the SWIFT telecom-
1 The Bank of Canada is a highly autonomous Crown corpora-
tion created through a special act of Parliament that sets its mandate,
powers, and objectives in broad terms. Special provisions in the
Bank of Canada Act safeguard the Bank’s autonomy. For instance,
the Governor and Senior Deputy Governor are appointed for a term
of seven years by the Bank’s Board of Directors (with the approval of
the Cabinet), not by the government. The Deputy Minister of
Finance, who sits on the Board of Directors, has no voting rights,
and the Bank submits its budget to its own Board, not to the
Treasury Board. 
2 For a time in the second half of the 1990s, the Bank used the
monetary conditions index (MCI), which includes both the real
short-term interest rate and the real exchange rate, as a guide. The
MCI can be viewed as the percentage point change in real interest
rates that is equivalent to the combined change in real interest rates
and the real exchange rate since a base period. MCI = [real interest
rate – real interest rate at base period] + (
1⁄3)[real effective exchange
rate index/real effective exchange rate index at base period) – 1]
(100). See Freedman (1996).
3 The last significant change occurred in 1992, with the begin-
ning of the phase-out of reserve requirements, which ended in 1994. 
4 The next day’s target balances are announced at 4:45 p.m.
each day.  
5 A relatively small value of paper-based items still clears
through the Automated Clearing Settlement System (ACSS) with
retroactive settlement. In a change from previous practice, ACSS 
balances are now treated like LVTS balances with no averaging peri-
od. The interest rates on ACSS overdrafts and positive balances are
150 basis points above and below the limits of the operating band. 
6 The Bank of Canada held 8 percent of Government of Canada
market debt in 1998. The Bank’s investments, which are funded pri-
marily by bank notes issued by the Bank, are largely Canadian gov-
ernment debt, which it usually holds until maturity.Second Quarter 2002 New England Economic Review 21
munications network. The Bank of Canada must also
confirm that each member has opened a settlement
account at the Bank and that it has agreed to take loans
from the Bank and to pledge appropriate collateral, as
needed. Each transfer of funds is subject to a set of risk
control tests performed at the central computer sup-
porting LVTS at the CPA. If a given transaction would
cause the sender’s net settlements position to turn
negative and exceed a specified cap (calculated as
described below), the payment will be rejected or put
in a queue. Otherwise, the payment is deemed final
and irrevocable. 
As part of the LVTS risk-control structure, each
participant’s net position is calculated payment by
payment, in real time, at the central computer; the par-
ticipants’ net debit positions are subject to ceilings;
and, before the start of each day, the participants joint-
ly pledge to the Bank of Canada appropriate securities
to cover the largest single permitted net debit position.
For each transaction, participants can choose between
two kinds of payment—tranche 1 (defaulter pays) and
tranche 2 (survivors pay). In the case of a tranche 1
payment, the participant can record a net debit posi-
tion no larger than the amount of collateral that the
institution has pledged that day for tranche 1 activity.
However, payments are more likely to be tranche 2
payments, because they economize on collateral. To
support tranche 2 transactions, every morning each
participant determines the largest net exposure it is
willing to accept versus each other participant that
day. Moreover, each participant has a tranche 2 debit
cap, currently set at 24 percent of all of the bilateral
credit lines extended to it. Should a participant
default, the other participants might face a settlement
obligation proportional to their credit line to the
defaulter divided by the sum of all of credit lines to the
defaulter. Thus, participants must pledge collateral
equal to 24 percent of the largest credit line they are
willing to extend. 
Collateral Eligible for LVTS
The participants set their net debit caps and bilat-
eral credit lines each morning and pledge the appro-
priate collateral to the Bank of Canada, which evalu-
ates the collateral to make sure that it is sufficient. The
Bank has developed a specialized computer system,
the Collateral Valuation and Tracking System, to mon-
itor and value this collateral each morning. The market
value is subject to a haircut that depends on the type of
security and the term to maturity.7 The list of eligible
collateral includes marketable securities denominated
in Canadian dollars and issued by or guaranteed by
the federal or provincial governments and National
Housing Act mortgage-backed securities (NHA MBS)
added to the list in February 1999.8 The set of accept-
able collateral will be expanded further in November
2001 to include bankers’ acceptances, commercial
paper, and corporate debt because the financial servic-
es industry has been pressing for such an increase,
given the collateral demands of the LVTS and the
reduced supply of Government of Canada debt. These
securities all meet the Bank’s criteria regarding risk,
secondary-market liquidity, operational and legal
issues, and ease of revaluation (based on uniformity
across instrument class). In addition, LVTS partici-
pants can open a Special Deposit Account at the Bank
of Canada, generally funded in the overnight market,
to serve as collateral. The Bank pays interest at the
published overnight rate less a margin (6.25 basis
points on December 31, 2000) on these deposits.
In preparation for the century date change, the
Bank of Canada announced that between November 1,
1999, and March 31, 2000, it would accept a wider
range of collateral for LVTS or ACSS overdrafts, as
well as for loans made through the Special Liquidity
Facility set up to relieve possible liquidity problems at
the turn of the year. The expanded range of collateral
included asset-backed securities, commercial paper,
corporate debt, and assignment of part of the loan
portfolio of borrowing institutions. Loans through the
Special Liquidity Facility were available at an interest
rate 125 basis points above Bank rate and for a maturi-
ty of up to five months to solvent participants in the
7 For federal government debt, the haircuts range from 1 per-
cent (adjusted for days to maturity/365) for maturities up to 1 year
to 2.5 percent for maturities of more than 10 years. At the other end
of the spectrum, the haircuts for debt with a provincial government
guarantee range from 3 percent to 5.5 percent depending on maturi-
ty. The haircuts for debt with a federal government guarantee
(including the National Housing Act mortgage-backed securities)
and for debt issued by the provincial governments lie in between.  
8 NHA MBS are pools of amortized residential mortgages
insured by the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation
(CMHC) on behalf of the Government of Canada. The issuers are
approved by CMHC and must be a chartered bank, a trust company,
an insurance company, a credit union, a loan company, or a caisse
populaire. The CMHC guarantees timely payment of principal and
interest, and insures the underlying mortgages. Unlike the deposit
insurance provided by the Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation,
which is limited to $60,000, the CMHC guarantee is unlimited. Four
types of MBS pools are available (homeowner, multifamily, social
housing, and mixed), and investments may be made in multiples of
$5,000 for maturities ranging from 6 months to 25 years. The NHA
MBS program was begun in 1987 to increase the availability of funds
for housing finance. In the first ten years of the program, over 45,000
retail and institutional investors invested more than $27 billion in
these securities.22 Second Quarter 2002 New England Economic Review
LVTS—at their initiative—to the extent that they could
offer acceptable collateral. In the event, the Bank
received no requests for loans from the Special
Liquidity Facility, although the primary dealers did
make some use of the extra (term) Special Purchase
and Resale Agreements that the Bank offered during
this period. The Bank of Canada did not extend these
special arrangements past the end of March 2000, but
has recently indicated that it would expand the list of
acceptable collateral once again, since the financial
services industry has a growing demand for a dwin-
dling supply of government securities.9 The Bank is
also working with the industry to find ways to satisfy
collateral requirements efficiently. For instance, the ease
with which the collateral pledged for the LVTS can be
turned into collateral for the overdraft facility required
the development of unique legal agreements.10
Fiscal Issues
As the fiscal agent for the federal government, the
Bank of Canada also manages the government’s bor-
rowings. The Canadian government moved into fiscal
surplus in 1997, a year before the United States. Thus,
one recent focus has been maintaining and improving
the liquidity of the markets for government debt. With
recent and projected net financial accounts near balance
or in surplus, despite government initiatives to cut taxes
and increase spending, the debt-to-GDP ratio has fallen
from a peak of 71 percent in 1995–96 to below 53 percent
at fiscal yearend 2000–01. Marketable federal govern-
ment securities outstanding have fallen from Can$441
billion in 1997 to Can$415 billion in March 2001, with
Treasuries accounting for much of the decline. The sup-
ply of Treasury bills outstanding dropped by half, from
Can$166 billion in 1996 to Can$89 billion in March 2001.
Gross new issuance of Government of Canada direct
and guaranteed bonds and notes is also down—from
Can$67billionin1996toCan$46billionin2000,withthe
net new issuance falling from Can$33 billion to negative
Can$5 billion over the same period.
In this environment of declining issuance and rel-
atively thin markets for 30-year securities, the govern-
ment instituted a pilot buyback program in 1998–99.
This program, which was designed to increase the
supply of more actively traded benchmark issues by
using new bond issuance to finance the buyback of
older, less liquid bonds, was implemented on an ongo-
ing basis in 2000–01. In addition, the government
intends to focus its borrowing in the key 5-, 10-, and
30-year maturities in order to increase the target size,
and thus the liquidity, of these key benchmark securi-
ties. Similarly, Treasury bills are now issued every sec-
ond week, instead of weekly. Because the decline in
the supply of government securities was seen to be
fostering market “squeezes,” the Bank and govern-
ment have also taken steps to ensure that the auction
process for government debt is free of manipulation.11
Interestingly, the turnover ratio in the bill and
bond markets declined following the liquidity crisis in
1998 as trading volumes fell. Turnover ratios stabilized
in 2000–01, however. Seemingly, “buy and hold”
investors have increased their weight relative to the
trading accounts. By contrast, the turnover rate in the
markets for asset-backed securities, futures, and cor-
porate debt has picked up, suggesting that these assets
may be filling some of the roles often performed by
government debt.12
Management of Foreign Exchange Reserves
As for the impact of a declining supply of U.S.
Treasury securities on the Bank of Canada’s manage-
ment of its foreign exchange reserves, the Bank cur-
rently holds about two-thirds of its reserves in U.S.
dollar-denominated assets with about 30 percent in
U.S. Treasury securities.13 It is in the process of reduc-
ing the share in U.S. Treasuries and moving into supra-
nationals and agencies.
9 The financial services industry requires these government
securities for repo and derivatives transactions, among others. The
Bank is thus grappling with the issue of whether the liquidity of the
financial markets is a public good that the Bank should support by
accepting a wider set of collateral.
10 By contrast, the Bank of Canada is also considering requiring
collateral for the government deposits it auctions daily. Such a
requirement could add to the pressures in the government securities
market.
11These steps included redefining government securities dis-
tributors and primary dealers, setting new bidding limits for gov-
ernment securities dealers and their customers, and enhancing the
Bank’s surveillance of the securities market.
12 See O’Regan (2000).
13 Prior to late 1998, the Bank of Canada typically held about 80
percent of its reserves in U.S. dollars.Second Quarter 2002 New England Economic Review 23
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